This war of attrition is not just being fought on the battlefields but in the hearts and minds of the electorate.
After weeks of slow, grinding attacks on Kherson in southern Ukraine, a sudden offensive in the centre, launched late last week, is now sending Russian forces east of Kharkov reeling back in disarray. Volodymyr Zelenskyy pulled a classic boxer's one/two punch. First, relentlessly focusing Vladimir Putin's attention on Kherson, an occupied city that dangled at the end of a narrow supply chain crossing a single bridge across the Dnieper. Then the switch: a rapid assault using tactical surprise to penetrate deep and recapture at least 400 square kilometres of ground. Coupled with a further 600 kilometres retaken in the south, the Ukrainians do currently appear to have gained the initiative.
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But what now?
Zelenskyy was beaming as he announced the victory on television. This, however, is merely a tactical victory and, however successful, it does not change the overall dynamic of the war. Although Putin's initial drive for Kiev failed and his troops have now been forced on the defensive, he can afford these setbacks.
The crucial factor for Kyiv is that time is running out.
At the beginning of the war Russia was on the offensive: today it's Ukraine that's attempting to take back territory. No journalists from either side are allowed near the front-line and there are no accurate reports providing granular detail of the fighting. Last week, however, The Washington Post had the bright idea of visiting hospitals and speaking to wounded Ukrainian fighters. The wounded and shocked soldiers told terrible stories of how some units attacking Kherson had losses of up to 7 per cent dead, with most other soldiers wounded. They insisted the Russians are using drones and precision artillery effectively to blast the Ukrainians whenever they think they're safe.
The attack is harder than defence. Although Ukrainian enthusiasm allows its forces to push forward, with every successive assault calculation quickly moves to the cost in lives of success. Instead of asking 'can we seize this critical point?' it becomes 'how many lives is that village, this ditch, actually worth?'. Not long ago most of Kyiv's soldiers were civilians: it's hardly surprising that few are prepared to risk their lives for a tiny bit of territory in a war that will continue on, regardless of the success or failure of any particular assault. Yet the problem with this is that even substantial advances such as this weeks' won't be enough to deliver victory. Russia, with its huge resources and ruled by an autocrat, is far better placed to fight a war of attrition than Ukraine.
The US has been generously supplying the expensive weapons Ukraine needs to fight the war but the cost of doing this has also been enormous. Western stockpiles are becoming depleted as missiles are used faster than they can be made. Suppliers are also understandably concerned that the ready availability of sophisticated equipment has lead to it being used wastefully and indiscriminately: the West simply can't afford to support an ongoing conflict like this forever.
The same countries that moved swiftly to support Ukraine and sanction Russia are also facing dilemmas. Moscow's decision to stop supplying Europe with the energy it needs is proving a very effective way of placing pressure on the democracies, particularly as India and China are stepping in to pick up the slack. Exacerbating this is the approach of winter after a terrible summer in the northern hemisphere as climate change adds instability to the electoral dynamic. A summer of intense heat is emptying the reservoir of support for Kyiv.
This war of attrition is not just being fought on the battlefields but in the hearts and minds of the electorate. Russia, of course, doesn't need to worry about placating voters and, as he sits surrounded by sycophants in the echoing halls of the Kremlin, there's no evidence that the one man who can decide when this war will end is feeling any pressure to conclude it.
This places pressure on Zelenskyy. Unless he is prepared to sit down to real negotiations all he can offer is a continuation of the killing and murder. This is why it's worth remembering that this is the same Ukrainian leader who last year ignored the West's warnings an invasion was being prepared. Zelenskyy has proven a terrific leader and demonstrated remarkable courage and fortitude - but this doesn't mean he will always possess the right insights to bring the war to an end.
The success of the current offensive might just be enough to restart peace talks but it won't, by itself, be nearly enough to win the war.
The reality is that individuals only become leaders when they can chart a clear path into a safe and positive future.
In that regard it's understandable that former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd took exception to a swift, two-sentence dismissal of his 2020 summit in last week's column. I had not intended to skewer the idea behind his initiative quite as callously as I did and should, instead, have welcomed the fact that Rudd recognised the country's problems would benefit from wider consideration and input. His summit was, however, very different from those held by both Anthony Albanese and Bob Hawke. These iterations had limited and tightly focused ambitions. Both were designed to tackle specific economic issues. Both succeeded.
Rudd's project was to accomplish something far more ambitious: he inquired about the future. But instead of drilling down to particular questions, his summit became a talisman of his leadership. Grand ideas, huge projects, but without clearly defining a path ahead. Ideas emerged from his grand forum, although not in any directed way. When (eventually) released even the summation of what the summit had been about was contested and argued. The fact that anything worthwhile (such as the NDIS) did finally emerge from the process depended entirely on the enthusiasm of a minister (like Bill Shorten) to grasp the idea and run with it.
At least Rudd tried. That's more than most of us.
- Nicholas Stuart is editor of ability.news and a regular columnist.